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Abstract. Fair exchange protocol aims to allow two parties to exchange
digital items in a fair manner. It is well-known that fairness can only be
achieved with the help of a trusted third party, usually referred to as
arbitrator. A fair exchange protocol is optimistic if the arbitrator is not
involved in the normal execution of the fair exchange process. That is, its
presence is necessary only when one of the exchanging parties is dishon-
est. Traditionally, the items being exchanged are digital signatures. In
this paper, we consider the items to be threshold signatures. Specifically,
the signatures are created by a subset of legitimate signers instead of a
single signer. We define a security model for this new notion, and pro-
vide an concrete instantiation. Our instantiation can be proven secure in
the random oracle model. Our definition covers the case when the item
being exchanged is a secret key of an identity-based encryption where
the master secret key is split amongst a set of authorities.
1 Introduction
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE), first introduced by Asokan, Schunter and Waid-
ner [1], is a kind of protocols aiming to guarantee fairness for two parties exchang-
ing digital items. In OFE, a trusted third party named “arbitrator” is needed
but only involved when there is a dispute between the participants. Traditionally
the digital items of interest are digital signatures and the optimistic exchange
of digital signatures constitutes an important part of any business transaction.
Typically such a protocol comprises three message flows. First Alice the signer
initiates the exchange by sending a partial signature to the receiver, say Bob.
The partial signature serves as a commitment assuring Bob of Alice’s full sig-
nature at the end of the protocol. After verifying the validity of Alice’s partial
signature, Bob sends its full signature to Alice in the second message flow. Later,
Alice should send her full signature back to Bob and complete the exchange. In
the case there is a network failure or Alice attempts to cheat by refusing to send
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her own full signature, Bob can ask the arbitrator to make a resolution with Al-
ice’s partial signature and his own full signature. In this case the arbitrator will
convert Alice’s partial signature into a full one and send it back to Bob. Note
that at the end of this exchange, either both Alice and Bob gain the other’s full
signature, or neither does. Thus the exchange is fair.
1.1 Related Work
As a useful tool in applications such as contract signing, electronic commerce
and even peer-to-peer file sharing, OFE has been extensively researched since
its introduction. There are several approaches in the construction of OFE, in-
cluding schemes based on verifiably encrypted signatures [2, 6, 5, 16, 21, 19], and
sequentially two-party multisignatures [8]. It was further showed that OFE can
be constructed from OR signature [7], and conventional signatures and ring sig-
natures [12]. Some desirable properties such as setup-free [22], stand-alone [22],
abuse-free [9], signer ambiguity [11], resolution ambiguity [17] and accountabil-
ity [13] are proposed in literatures as well.
In [3] and [15], OFE employing multiple arbitrators are discussed to reduce
the trust placed on the single arbitrator. Unfortunately, the existing techniques
are either expensive or rely on synchronized clocks, which is undesirable as
achieving synchronization in a peer-to-peer setting in which the arbitrators do
not even know each other is hard.
Most of the previous works on OFE are done in the individual setting, in
which the two involving parties are individual users and they represents them-
selves. An interesting scenario in OFE is that either party consists of a group
of users. In such a scenario, every single user in the group can execute transac-
tions with another party on behalf of its group, but the actual signer’s identity
should be protected from outsiders. In [18], the authors employ a ring signature
such that all the users’ public keys are involved in the ring to hide the actual
signer’s identity and at the same time ensure that each signer can sign on behalf
on the group. Later, optimistic fair exchange of group signatures is considered
in [10]. The difference between optimistic fair exchange of ring signatures and
that of group signatures is similar with the difference between ring signatures
and group signatures. There are some subtle difference though. For instance,
the user in ring signature setting can choose its key pair by himself while in the
group signature setting, a group manager is responsible to the generation of a
user’s key pair. Furthermore, optimistic fair exchange of group signatures has
the additional feature that the anonymity of a signer can be revoked by its group
manager. One common characteristic that the above two constructions shares is
that a single user in the group represents the whole group.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work on OFE discussing
about the scenario that only a least number of users together can represent the
group. That is, for a group of n users, only at least t users of them together can
sign on behalf of the group and make exchanges with other parties. We intro-
duce the notion of threshold-oriented optimistic fair exchange (TOFE), which
in essence is optimistic fair exchange of threshold signatures. In the exchange
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outsiders have no idea which subset of the users actually participated in the gen-
eration of a threshold signature. This can be viewed as a natural way to reduce
the trust placed on every single user of the group.
Besides, TOFE has other practical applications. For example, consider the
case in which two parties intend to exchange a secret key of an identity-based
encryption (IBE) [4]. In an identity-based setting, the key generation centre
(KGC) is a high value target to adversaries as compromising the master key will
break the whole system. Thus the master key is typically split amongst a set of
authorities so that only when a threshold of authorities together can create a
secret key for an identity [14]. Remember that the secret key of an identity can
be viewed as a digital signature on the user’s identity from the KGC [4]. Thus,
fair exchange of secret key of an identity-based encryption also falls within the
model of OFE. In case when the master key is split amongst a set of authorities
and two KGCs, perhaps each for a certain geographic location, would like to
exchange a secret key of a specific identity, threshold-oriented would be useful.
The table below summarizes the categories of exchanged digital items that
has been discussed in the literatures.
Schemes Digial Items Exchanged
traditional OFE individual signatures
Qu et al. [18] ring signatures
Huang et al. [10] group signatures
Our Scheme threshold signatures / secret keys of an IBE
Table 1. digital items that are exchanged in OFE
1.2 Contribution.
In this paper, we study optimistic fair exchange in a threshold-oriented setting.
Specifically, we present a formal definition for TOFE. We propose a concrete
construct and demonstrate that our construction in secure in the random oracle
model.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we review notations and technical preliminaries. In Section 3, the syntax of
TOFE and its security definitions are presented. We present our construction in
Section 4. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 5. In Appendix ??, we prove
the security of our construction under well-known assumptions in the random
oracle model.
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2 Preliminary
If n is a positive integer, we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. If p is a prime,
we use Zp to denote the set {0, . . . , p − 1} and Z∗p to denote the set {a|a ∈
Zp ∧ gcd(a, p) = 1}.
2.1 Bilinear Pairing
Let G, GT be two cyclic groups such that |G| = |GT | = p. We say that ê is a
bilinear map if ê : G×G → GT possesses the following properties.
– Elements of G, GT have unique binary representation.
– For all elements of g, h ∈ G, x, y ∈ Zp, it holds that
ê(ga, hb) = ê(g, h)ab
– There exists g, h ∈ G such that ê(g, h) is not the identity element of GT .
2.2 Number-theoretic Assumptions
We review the following well-known computational assumptions.
Definition 1 (DL Assumption). Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order
p. The discrete logarithm assumption states that given a tuple (g, Z) ∈ (G,G),
it is computationally infeasible to compute the value z ∈ Zp such that Z = gz.
Definition 2 (CDH Assumption). Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime
order p. The computational Diffie-Hellman assumption states that given a tuple
(g, ga, gb) ∈ (G,G,G), it is computationally infeasible to compute the value gab.
2.3 Secret Sharing
We review the principle of the well-known Shamir secret sharing scheme [20]
here. Roughly speaking, a secret sharing scheme allows a user to divide a value
into n pieces, called shares, so that any t share holders together can recover
the secret. The major idea is that it takes t points to define a polynomial, say,
f(x) of degree t − 1. One could generate f in such a way that f(0) is secret
to be shared. Each share is then a point (i, f(i). Now with t points, one could
recover the polynomial and thus the value f(0). On the other hand, with only
t− 1 points, nothing about f(0) would be revealed since there are exponentially
many curves that pass through those t− 1 points.
Preparation Let x be the secret to be shared. Randomly pick a polynomial f
of degree t− 1 such that f(0) = x. Each share is defined as (i, f(i)) for i = 1
to n.
Reconstruction One could make use of Langrange interpolation to recover the
value f(0) when t points are given.
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– Let I be a set such that |I| = t and that for all i ∈ I, f(i) is known.











Since we are interested in f(0) in the secret sharing scheme, we use λi to
denote the value of λi(0) and referred to it as the Langrange coefficient.












3 Definition of TOFE
3.1 Syntax
We adapt the definitions and security models of OFE from various literatures
for our TOFE. For efficiency consideration, our definition of TOFE consists
of non-interactive algorithms only. That is, we require that no communication
between signers is necessary during the partial or full signature generation. The
following enumerate the syntax of a construction of TOFE, which consists of
seven algorithms. In addition, we adopt the common reference string model.
– Common Reference String Generation On input a security parameter 1k,
this algorithm outputs a common reference string paramCRS which includes
the security parameter 1k. We assume paramCRS is an implicit input to all
algorithms described below.
– (pkA, skA) ← AGen() This algorithm outputs the arbitrator key pairs (pkA,
skA).
– (pkU , {skU,i}ni=1) ← UGen(n, t) This algorithm takes as input the required
number of signers n, the threshold t and output the public key of the user
pkU , together with n secret signing keys for the signers skU,i.
– PSign = (PSign(s),PSign(v),PSign(g)) This is a suite of three algorithms
which allows a subset of signers to create a partial signature.
• σ̂i ← PSign(s)(pkA,M, skU,i) On input the public key of the arbitrator
pkA, a message M and a secret signing key of signer i, this algorithm
outputs a partial signature share for signer i.
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• valid/invalid ← PSign(v)(pkA, pkU ,M, σ̂i, i) On input the public key
of the arbitrator pkA and that of the user pkU , a message M , a partial
signature share σ̂i from signer i, this algorithm checks the validity of the
partial signature share created by signer i.
• σ̂ ← PSign(g)(pkA, pkU ,M, {σ̂i}i∈I , I) On input the public key of the
arbitrator pkA and that of the user pkU , a message M , t partial signature
shares {σ̂i} for i ∈ I such that I ⊂ [n] and |I| = t, this algorithm outputs
a partial signature.
– valid/invalid ← PVer(pkA, pkU ,M, σ̂) This algorithm checks the valid-
ity of a partial signature σ̂ on message M based on the public key of the
arbitrator pkA, the public key of the user pkU .
– Sign = (Sign(s), Sign(v), Sign(g)) Similar to the partial signature generation
process, the signing algorithm is also a set of three algorithms which allows
a subset of signers to create a signature.
• σi ← Sign(s)(pkA,M, skU,i) On input public key of the arbitrator pkA,
message M and secret signer key of signer i, this algorithm outputs a
signature share for signer i.
• valid/invalid ← Sign(v)(pkA, pkU ,M, σi, i) This algorithm checks the
validity of the signature share σi created by signer i based on the public
key of the arbitrator pkA, the public key of the user pkU and message
M .
• σ ← Signg(pkA, pkU ,M, {σi}i∈I , I) On input the public key of the ar-
bitrator pkA and that of the user pkU , a message M , t signature shares
{σ̂i} for i ∈ I such that I ⊂ [n] and |I| = t, this algorithm outputs a
signature.
– valid/invalid ← Ver(pkA, pkU ,M, σ) This algorithm checks the validity of
a signature σ on message M based on the public key of the arbitrator pkA
and that of the user pkU .
– σ ← Res(pkA, pkU ,M, σ̂, skA) Given a valid partial signature σ̂, a message
M , public key of the user pkU , key pair of the arbitrator (pkA, skA), this
algorithm allows the arbitrator to output a signature on message M . Note
that ⊥ is returned if invalid ← PVer(pkA, pkU ,M, σ̂).
Correctness A construction of TOFE is correct if the following conditions hold:
1. Any partial signature created by any t honest signers using PSign will be
valid under PVer.
2. Any signature created by any t honest signers using Sign will be valid under
Ver.
3. Any signature created by the arbitrator using Res based on a valid partial
signature will be valid under Ver.
Furthermore, it is required that any signature created by the arbitrator using
Res based on a valid partial signature will be indistinguishable to the signature
created by any t honest signers using Sign.
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3.2 A Typical Usage of the TOFE Algorithms
Note that in OFE with three message flows between the initiator Alice and the
receiver Bob, the item to be sent by Bob is not restricted to any format. It
could be a physical item such as money. For simplicity we assume the item to
be sent by Bob is a digital signature. Nonetheless, it could be a ring signature,
a group signature or a threshold signature. Below we show how Alice and Bob
can conduct an exchange based on our definition of TOFE. Note that the party
Alice in TOFE consists of a group of n signers, and only when t-out-of-n signers.
An exchange is possible only when t signers agree to participate.
Our definition of TOFE does not require the set of t signers to communicate
with each other. Below is a typical usage of our definition of TOFE algorithms.
1. Partial Signature Shares Collection Bob approaches each signer indepen-
dently and the parties agree on the items to be exchanged. The signer, say
signer i invokes PSign(s) and sends the share of the partial signature σ̂i to
Bob. Bob uses PSign(v) to verify the share.
2. Partial Signature Generation Upon collecting t partial signature shares, Bob
invokes PSign(g) to generate a partial signature σ̂. He invokes PVer to ensure
its validity.
3. Obligation Fulfillment If the partial signature Bob obtained is valid, he fulfill
his obligations. In this example, Bob sends his digital signature to all the
signers involved.
4. Signature Shares Collection Each signer validates that Bob has fulfilled his
obligations. In this example, each signer checks that the digital signature sent
by Bob is valid. If yes, each signer, say signer i, invokes Sign(s) and sends
the share of the signature σi to Bob, who checks its validity with Sign(v).
5. Signature Generation Upon collecting t signature shares, Bob invokes Sign(g)
to generate a signature σ. He invokes Ver to ensure its validity. If yes, the
exchange process is completed.
6. Resolution Suppose some signers refuse to send their signature shares, or that
the signature created in signature generation is invalid, Bob can approach
the arbitrator for assistance. Specifically, he approaches the arbitrator proves
that he has fulfilled his obligation. After that, Bob submits the valid partial
signature σ̂ to the arbitrator. The arbitrator sends back the signature σ by
invoking Res and this completes the exchange.
7. Remarks In this example, Bob can send his digital signature to the arbitrator
as a proof of obligation fulfillment. Even if Bob is lying, the arbitrator can
still give this digital signature to the signers should they also complain and
thus the exchange could be completed regardless of what happen afterwards.
3.3 Security Model
Traditionally, any construction of optimistic fair exchange should be secure in
three aspects, namely, security against signers, security against verifiers and se-
curity against the arbitrator respectively. As suggested by the respective names,
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they intend to cover the scenarios when the named party is dishonest. We modify
the traditional model in the threshold setting. Specifically, the verifier can col-
lude with t−1 malicious signers in our consideration of security against verifiers.
Security Against Signers This property guarantees that even when all the
signers collude together, they cannot create a partial signature that passes the
partial signature verification algorithm PVer yet it cannot be resolved into a full
signature by the arbitrator. This property intends to protect honest verifiers.
Specifically, we use the following three-phase game between a challenger C and
an adversary A to define this property.
Initialization A specifies the number of signers n and the threshold t. C creates
the common reference string paramCRS and invokes
(pkA, skA) ← AGen(),
(pkU , {skU,i}ni=1) ← UGen(n, t).
C gives (paramCRS , pkA, pkU , {skUi}ni=1) to A.
Query A can adaptively issue the following query to C.
– Res Query. A gives (σ̂,M) to C, who invokes
σ ← Res(pkA, pkU ,M, σ̂, skA)
and returns σ to A.
End-Game A submits (M∗, σ̂∗) and wins the game if
valid ← PVer(pkA, pkU ,M∗, σ̂∗)
invalid ← Ver(pkA, pkU ,M∗,Res(pkA, pkU ,M, σ̂∗, skA)
)
Security Against Verifiers This property guarantees that even when the
verifier colludes with t − 1 signers, they cannot create a valid full signature.
This property intends to protect honest signers. Our model is static in the sense
that the subset of signers to be controlled by the attacker is fixed during the
initialization phase. Specifically, we use the following three-phase game between
a challenger C and an adversary A to define this property.
Initialization A specifies the number of signers n and the threshold t, together
with an index set I ′ ⊂ [n] such that |I ′| = t − 1. C creates the common
reference string paramCRS and invokes
(pkA, skA) ← AGen(),
(pkU , {skU,i}ni=1) ← UGen(n, t).
C gives (paramCRS , pkA, pkU , {skUi}i∈I′) to A.
Query A can adaptively issue the following query to C.
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– PSigns Query. A gives (M, i) to C, who invokes
σ̂i ← PSign(s)(pkA,M, skU,i)
and returns σ̂i to A.
– Signs Query. A gives (M, i) to C, who invokes
σi ← Sign(s)(pkA,M, skU,i)
and returns σi to A.
– Res Query. A gives (σ̂,M) to C, who invokes
σ ← Res(pkA, pkU ,M, σ̂, skA)
and returns σ to A.
End-Game A submits (M∗, σ̂∗) and wins the game if
valid ← Ver(pkA, pkU ,M∗, σ̂∗)
and that (M∗, ·) did not appear in any Sign(s) query. Furthermore, if there
exists a PSign(s) query with input (M
∗, ·), (·,M∗) should not appear as input
in any Res query.
Security Against the Arbitrator This property guarantees that the arbi-
trator cannot create a signature on behalf of the user unless it is given a valid
partial signature. In TOFE, we allow the arbitrator to collude with t − 1 sign-
ers. As in the case of security against verifiers, our model is static in the sense
that the subset of signers to be controlled by the attacker is fixed during the
initialization phase. Specifically, we use the following three-phase game between
a challenger C and an adversary A to define this property.
Initialization A specifies the number of signers n and the threshold t, together
with an index set I ′ ⊂ [n] such that |I ′| = t − 1. C creates the common
reference string paramCRS and invokes
(pkA, skA) ← AGen(),
(pkU , {skU,i}ni=1) ← UGen(n, t).
C gives (paramCRS , pkA, pkU , {skUi}i∈I′ , skA) to A.
Query A can adaptively issue the following query to C.
– PSigns Query. A gives (M, i) to C, who invokes
σ̂i ← PSign(s)(pkA,M, skU,i)
and returns σ̂i to A.
– Signs Query. A gives (M, i) to C, who invokes
σi ← Sign(s)(pkA,M, skU,i)
and returns σi to A.
End-Game A submits (M∗, σ̂∗) and wins the game if
valid ← Ver(pkA, pkU ,M∗, σ̂∗)
and that (M∗, ·) did not appear in any Sign(s) query nor PSign(s) query.
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4 Construction
Our TOFE is motivated by the ordinary OFE by [5]. Indeed, when t = n = 1,
our construction degenerates to their scheme.
Common Reference String Our construction works in the common reference
string model. For a security parameter 1k, let G, GT be cyclic groups of prime
order p with g as a generator of G, where p is a k-bit prime. Further, let ê :
G×G → GT be a bilinear map. The common reference string is defined to be
paramCRS := (1
k,G,GT , p, g, ê).
AGen On input paramCRS , the arbitrator picks at random y ∈R Zp and computes






UGen On input paramCRS , the required number of signers n and the threshold
t, the user picks at random a polynomial of degree t−1 in Zp, say f . Assume the
signers are indexed by i, for i = 1 to n, with n ≥ t ≥ 1. The user further picks
at random a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G. Note that H is to be modelled as a
random oracle.
For i = 1 to n, the secret signing key of signer i is defined as f(i).
The user computes the public key as
pkU := (H,X,X1, . . . , Xn) := (H, g
f(0), gf(1), . . . , gf(n)).
The value f(0), which is the actual master secret, should be deleted. This
ensures only a set of t signers together could create a threshold signature.
Remarks: If the signers are supposed to be honest, only X is necessary. The
other components allows dishonest signer to be identified.
PSign The partial signature generation process consists of three sub-algorithms.
– Generation of a Partial Signature Share On input paramCRS , pkA, a message
M and the signing key of signer i f(i), signer i randomly picks ri ∈R Zp and
outputs the partial signature share as
σ̂i := (αi, βi) :=
(
H(M)f(i)Y ri , gri
)
.
– Verification of a Partial Signature Share The partial signature share σ̂i can
be verified by evaluating the following relation:
ê(αi, g)
?
= ê(H(M), Xi)ê(Y, βi).
Remarks: We would like to remark again that this is not necessary if the
signers are assumed to be trusted.
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– Generation of a Partial Signature When t partial signature shares, say, σ̂i
for i ∈ I ⊂ [n] such that |I| = t on the same message, say M , have been
collected, anyone can output the partial signature on message M as:













As discussed, f(0) =
∑
i∈I f(i)λi.
PVer On input paramCRS , pkA, pkU , a message M and a partial signature σ̂,
the algorithm outputs valid if and only if the following equality holds:





Sign The full signature generation process consists of three sub-algorithms as
well.
– Generation of a Signature Share On input paramCRS , pkA, a message M
and the signing key of signer i f(i), signer i outputs the signature share as
σi := H(M)
f(i).
– Verification of a Signature Share The signature share σi can be verified by




Remarks: We would like to remark again that this is not necessary if the
signers are assumed to be trusted.
– Generation of a Signature When t signature shares, say, σi for i ∈ I ⊂ [n]
such that |I| = t on the same message, say M , have been collected, anyone











Ver On input paramCRS , pkA, pkU , a messageM and a signature σ, the algorithm
outputs valid if and only if the following equality holds:
ê(σ, g) = ê(H(M), X).
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Res On input paramCRS , pkA, pkU , a message M , a partial signature σ̂ and the
secret key of the arbitrator y, the full signature can be computed as follows.
– Check that σ̂ is a valid partial signature by evaluating the relation
ê(α, g)
?
= ê(H(M), X)ê(Y, β).
– Output σ as
σ := α/βy.
Regarding the security of our construction of TOFE, we have the following
theorem, whose proof can be found in the full paper.
Theorem 1. Our construction of name is secure against signers, verifiers and
the arbitrator under the CDH assumption in the random oracle model.
5 Conclusion
We present the first threshold-oriented fair exchange protocol which allows a
subset of signers to exchange a digital item with a counter party. Indeed, in
our specific construction, the item being exchanged is a threshold signature. We
define formal security model for TOFE, present an efficient construction and
show that it is secure in the random oracle model under well-known assumptions.
We leave construction of TOFE in the standard model as an open problem.
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